I am a Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) at the
School of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science
of the University of Essex, and
and a Collaborating Senior Researcher at the Archimedes
Research Unit of the Athena Research Center.
I enjoy working on algorithmic problems lying in the intersection of discrete mathematics,
computer science and economics, often related to social choice theory.
I have a particular interest in fair division, in algorithmic mechanism design, and in graph sampling.
I am currently the PI of the NWO VENI project Algorithmic Fair Division in Dynamic, Socially
Until recently I was also affiliated with the
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
of the University of Amsterdam as an associate member of the
Computational Social Choice Group
Before joining Essex, I worked as a postdoctoral researcher at the Sapienza
University of Rome, hosted by Stefano
Leonardi, and at the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), hosted by
Guido Schäfer. I completed my PhD at
Athens University of Economics and Business, under the
supervision of Vangelis Markakis.
News: Our paper with Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos, Evangelos Markakis, and Georgios Papasotiropoulos
On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes
has been accepted to
News: Our paper with Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
has been accepted to
Mathematics of Operations Research!
News: Our paper with Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, and Alexandros A. Voudouris
Don't Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond has been accepted to the
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics!
News: We organized (with Alexandros A. Voudouris and Georgios Birmpas) the
on Fair Resource Allocation: Concepts, Algorithms and Complexity (FaiRACAC 2023)
on the first day of SAGT 2023!
News: Our paper with Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, and Artem Tsikiridis
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design:
Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
has been accepted to WINE 2023!
Department of Mathematical Sciences
University of Essex
Colchester Campus, CO4 3SQ